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Executive Summary 
 
1. The National Audit Office (hereafter NAO) and the Committee of Public Accounts in the 
House of Commons (hereafter PAC) are the two key institutions in the state-audit framework 
in the UK and English central government. They play important roles in defining the ‘risk 
landscape’ for public policy-making, both in the sphere of government and regulation and in 
wider society in general. This paper explores how the two institutions inter-relate with one 
another in the area of risk. 
 
2. NAO is the UK’s Supreme Audit Institution (SAI). Although since devolution it also works 
alongside Audit Scotland, the Wales Audit Office and the Northern Ireland Audit Office. 
Within England NAO has an important turf-boundary with the Audit Commission in respect  
to local authorities, police forces and the NHS. The head of NAO is the Comptroller and 
Auditor General (C&AG), currently Amyas Morse. NAO has two key roles: first, it undertakes 
financial audits of central government accounts continuously, from which it published reports 
on a yearly basis; and second it produces around 60 value for money (VFM) audit reports  
a year on selected issues and policies. All VFM reports take government policy as read and 
focus on how it is being implemented. Most reports are assessed in hearings by PAC and  
it is these that primarily define the risk landscape for senior civil servants. VFM studies 
typically cost on the order of £300-400,000 and take six months to a year to complete.  
 
3. All VFM reports must be cleared by the Department or body that is under investigation in 
order to prevent any unagreed facts going in front of PAC; departments’ amendments often 
serve to ‘blunt’ NAO’s criticism, creating blander and sometimes euphemistic language. At 
the same time, NAO is an expensive operation costing £73.9 million a year and employing 
900 staff. A key part of NAO’s legitimacy in the VFM role depends on its ability to generate 
financial savings to departments that are at least 9 times greater than NAO’s costs. In 2007 
NAO claimed nearly £600 million of financial saving were achieved. 
 
4. NAO is a parliamentary and not a government agency, but it is free (by statute) to pursue 
an audit agenda and report publicly without external influence, even from MPs. The Public 
Accounts Commission acts as the commissioning body for NAO, and approves its finances 
and oversees its governance arrangements. Following revelations about the expense  
claims of the former C&AG (Sir John Bourne) by Private Eye magazine in 2007, the Public 
Accounts Commission asked John Tiner to review NAO’s governance structures. As a result 
of his recommendations, a nine member board was created for NAO, with its own Chairman 
(currently Andrew Likierman), and the C&AG will be limited to a ten-year term of office. 
(Previous C&AGs served an initially undefined term until their retirement, in Sir John 
Bourne’s case lasting for 20 years.) 
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5. The C&AG agrees a yearly programme of reports for review with the PAC. Within PAC 
the most influential figure is the Chairman, currently Edward Leigh MP. By convention the 
Chair is always drawn from the main opposition party. Once a VFM study is published by 
NAO, in just under three quarters of cases PAC then takes the report and conducts an  
oral evidence session. Here Permanent Secretaries and other senior civil servants are 
questioned by the Chair and committee members about the programme in question. Several 
months after this, PAC produces a report of their findings. PAC reports are written by NAO 
for the PAC Chair who exerts a good deal of influence on their judgements. PAC reports are 
not constrained by the clearance process applied to VFM studies, and hence they are often 
franker in their criticisms. The final stage of the VFM process is that the government must 
formally reply to PAC reports in the form of a published Treasury Minute, in practice written 
by departments responding to the criticisms and recommendations made. Typically, 
departments accept 93 per cent of PAC’s recommendations. For the VFM reports that  
do not go to PAC or have a PAC report, there is no Treasury Minute. 
 
6. The number of NAO reports averages 56 per year, but varies with the length of the 
parliamentary session. For instance, there were 32 reports produced in the 2004-2005 
session (curtailed due to the election in 2005) and 84 in the 2005-2006 session. 
Approximately 70 per cent of NAO’s VFM reports are reviewed by the PAC: on average the 
Committee handles 40 such reports per parliamentary session. On average, 25 of these 
reports are from the current parliamentary session, with the remainder made up from the 
previous NAO session or sessions.  
 
7. On average, PAC itself produces 17 reports per 100 days of a parliamentary session. 
Delays can result when selecting PAC members at the beginning of a new Parliament (of 
around 38 days on average). Revised Commons reforms may reduce this initial lag-time 
from 2010 onwards. PAC hearings engage a large number of witnesses, nearly 1,250 
between 2003 and 2008, three quarters drawn from government departments and NAO, 
around a fifth from public bodies and non-ministerial departments and the small remainder 
from executive agencies. 
 
8. NAO and the PAC are highly influential bodies with government and within wider society 
because of their high media profile. Their reports cumulatively inform and define media 
discourses about risk based innovation within government, and about the risk of failures for 
large and often costly programmes. Research reported here shows that NAO attracts over 
1,000 mentions in the UK press annually for certain key words. The PAC has interest levels 
in the low 100’s, and this mostly focuses on the most vigorous pronouncements of the Chair, 
Edward Leigh, who most often handles broadcast coverage of NAO/PAC work. NAO and 
PAC are influenced by a number of often subtle factors. Government policy plays an 
important role as does the ‘agenda’ of MPs who lobby the PAC and the most pressing 
concerns of PAC members. Treasury is also influential through its budgetary role. There  
is some NAO influence from large private audit companies (who undertake some of the 
financial audit work), from management consultancies (of which some of the largest serve  
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as NAO’s ‘strategic partners’ in undertaking VFM work), and from professions and 
academics in particular issue areas. (LSE Public Policy Group also served as an NAO 
strategic partner from 2003 to 2009 and has worked for NAO since 1996.) 
 
9. Four main types of risk are frequently considered by NAO and PAC: 
• Major project risks 
• Administrative risks 
• Overall budgetary and financial management risks; and  
• Regulatory risk 
We cover each of these in detail in the main report. 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 1: 
The National Audit Office 
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Chapter 1:  
The National Audit Office 
 
1.1 NAO has a statutory responsibility under the National Audit Act 1983 to examine three 
areas of the operation of government departments and agencies: economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness (the three ‘E’s). Like other Parliamentary agencies NAO operates outside of 
the civil service and regular Treasury control processes. With a budget set by Parliament 
NAO is independent of the government of the day and its 900 staff are not civil servants 
(although their pay and conditions of service are closely similar). However, a key corollary  
of this independence is that NAO may not examine the merits of governmental policy in its 
VFM studies or financial audits. Instead it must restrict its analysis to focus only on how  
well those policies have been implemented. 
 
1.2 The Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) is head of NAO and is a very powerful 
figure in defining how it operates, known internally by officials as ‘the Boss’. He or she is an 
Officer of the House of Commons, and is appointed by the Queen, moved by an address 
from the Prime Minister, with the agreement of the PAC Chairman (always drawn from the 
main opposition party). As the C&AG is appointed by the Queen, they can similarly only be 
dismissed by the Queen before their term of office expires, on an address from both Houses 
of Parliament (Public Accounts Commission, 2008). If the C&AG wishes to resign, this must 
be done in writing to the Prime Minister. Until 2009 C&AGs had no term of office and could 
serve until they decided to retire. This made the C&AG near irremovable. However, the role 
is currently in a period of change. From January 1988 to January 2008, Sir John Bourne held 
this post. He was succeeded by an acting C&AG (Tim Burr) for just over a year, and then by 
the current C&AG, Amyas Morse, the first to have a defined single non-renewable term of  
10 years. 
 
1.3 A little-known body called the Public Accounts Commission (TPAC) is the commissioning 
body for NAO. By convention the Commission is chaired by the leading or oldest 
government MP sitting on the PAC (currently the Rt Hon Alan Williams) as a counter-weight 
to the opposition Chair of PAC. The Commission’s role is to approve the finances of NAO 
and to oversee its governance. According to statute, the Commission consists of the 
Chairman of the PAC, the Leader of the House of Commons (currently Harriet Harman), and 
seven other members of the House of Commons appointed by the House (ministers are 
excluded). It is the body which oversees the auditing of the auditors. While the Commission 
does approve NAO budgets, the C&AG has statutory discretion over audit work, so that the 
Public Accounts Commission never involves itself with the day-to-day administration and 
operations of NAO.  
 
1.4 While rather limited in its oversight of NAO, the Public Accounts Commission can query 
NAO budgets, which the Office negotiates and agrees with the Treasury. The Commission 
has recently been concerned at levels of underspending by NAO. This extract from the July 
2008 Commission hearing to consider of NAO’s corporate plan for 2009-10 to 2010-11  
is illustrative: 
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AUSTIN MITCHELL (Commission Member):  
…We’ve been consistently promoting a series of 6 per cent annual increases for NAO, 
which I think is important for its work. The Treasury is always grudging. It’s grudging 
about virtue as well as vice, but it’s worrying to think that, you know, these haven’t  
been spent, because I always believe in throwing money at problems and it makes me 
wonder if either you’re not pushing things hard enough, you’re not ambitious enough, 
you’re not aggressive enough, you’re not employing enough staff. I mean, what is the 
problem? Has there not been enough for you to do or has there been a problem in 
getting the competent staff to do it? Why is it under-spent? 
(Corrected Transcript of TPAC Meeting on 2 July 2008) 
 
1.5 NAO produces financial audit reports on an annual basis where it certifies government 
departments’ accounts. In 2008, NAO audited 462 government accounts. In this role, NAO 
promotes a culture of robust financial management practice in government departments and 
agencies. Alongside financial audits, NAO undertakes VFM reports on specific government 
departments and their programmes, projects and activities. In practice, VFM reports are 
mainly published from October to June to fit with the Parliamentary session timetable. NAO 
has a large pool of government organisations which they can potentially audit regularly, 
spanning the 15 main ministerial departments in Whitehall and around 135 other major 
agencies and NDPBs (non-departmental public bodies). In 2007 the Office looked at projects 
valued at over £450 billion. NAO also provides limited support to some Parliamentary Select 
Committees apart from the PAC (16 in 2007), mainly in the form of briefings and reports 
addressing departmental performance. While currently NAO is limited to UK and English 
central government in its audits, there is a possibility that there may soon be a role for it in 
auditing publicly funded companies, such as the large banks with new majority government 
financial stakes, for example. Its role has recently expanded in relation to auditing both the 
BBC and the operations of the Royal Household that draw on government funding. However 
the outcome of discussions about NAO’s role vis-à-vis the newly nationalized banks remains 
to be seen. 
 
1.6 NAO spent £88.5 million on its operations in 2007. It also undertakes fee paying audit 
work, from which it earned £17.8 million in the same year. By improving government 
efficiency and achieving other savings NAO aims to ‘save’ £9 for every £1 spent on its 
budget. (Previously this used to be an 8:1 ratio.) In 2007 the Office claimed to have saved 
the government £544.2 million from its VFM audits, and £53.3 million through its financial 
audit and good governance work – numbers that are negotiated with the Treasury. In 2007 
(as every year) the 9:1 ratio was clearly achieved if the total resource requirement of £70.7 
million used – the exact amount is actually £9.28 per £1 of resources required. Yet NAO’s 
total departmental audit function brings it into contact with programmes valued at £450 billion 
annually. Comparing this amount with the savings achieved suggests that NAO saves £1 for 
every £686 of government money examined, or 0.15 per cent of expenditure annually. 
 
1.7 In July 2007, after a large amount of media interest in the travel and subsistence 
expenses of the C&AG, the Public Accounts Commission (TPAC) decided to review 
corporate governance in NAO, to ensure that it followed best practice. This report was 
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undertaken by the Chief Executive of the Financial Services Authority, John Tiner, and 
published in February 2008 as the Tiner Review. The Public Accounts Commission  
produced their response to the report in March 2008 as their Fifteenth Report, where they 
recommended significant changes to NAO’s governance structure. The report proposed the 
creation for the first time of an NAO Board, on which the C&AG would sit as Chief Executive, 
with a non-extendable term of 10 years, in order to prevent the association of NAO with  
one particular C&AG for too long a term. The Board would have a Chair, who would be non-
executive and have a three year term, renewable once. The Chair would be appointed in the 
same way as the C&AG, by the agreement of the Prime Minister and the Chair of the PAC, 
and would be a crown appointment. The Chair role is largely internal in focus, with the post 
holder speaking only about governance matters, rather than the NAO’s audit programme  
or reports.  
 
1.8 The Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill, which was presented to parliament for 
its first reading on 20 July 2009, states that NAO is to be constituted as a corporate body, 
with a board consisting of members with expertise in government efficiency and other 
savings, five non-executives including the Chair, and four executive directors, including  
the C&AG. The appointment of the non-executives is approved by the Public Accounts 
Commission, and their main role is to contribute to the Board’s strategy development, 
corporate assurance and governance objectives. The time commitments for non-executive 
board members are envisioned to be in the order of two days per month, with a yearly 
remuneration of £20,000 for this work. On 1 January, 2009, Andrew Likierman was 
appointed as Chair of NAO Board, and on 20 May the Public Accounts Commission 
appointed Ruth Evans, Richard Fleck, Dame Mary Keegan and Sir Joseph Pilling as non-
executive directors of the National Audit Office. Figure 1 shows the new governance 
arrangements as of June 2009. 
 
1.9 NAO now uses outsourced contracting for its VFM studies to a far greater degree than in 
the past. In 2005-06 contracted input made up about 20 per cent of the Office’s budget, and 
70 per cent of VFM studies in 2003-04 used outside assistance, rising to 80 per cent in 2004-
05 (Lonsdale, 2008). Following on from this, NAO has developed a number of long-term 
‘strategic partnerships’ with external contractors providing a variety of services, from short 
reports such as literature reviews, research work for VFM studies, or entire VFM studies. 
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Figure 1: Governance Structure of NAO at June 2009 
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Chapter 2:  
The Public Accounts Committee 
 
2.1 The Committee of Public Accounts dates back to a House of Commons standing order 
from 1862, which reads: “That there shall be a Standing Committee of Public Accounts; for  
the examination of the Accounts showing the appropriation of sums granted by Parliament  
to meet the Public Expenditure, to consist of nine members, who shall be nominated at the 
commencement of every Session, and of whom five shall be a quorum” (Committee of Public 
Accounts, 2007). Since 1983, the PAC’s primary role has been to examine NAO Value for 
Money (VFM) reports and to take oral and written evidence from Permanent Secretaries and 
Accounting Officers, although it also considers key matters arising from NAO financial audits. 
 
2.2 The PAC has sixteen members, and a quorum of four. In the past members are 
nominated at the beginning of each Parliament, on the basis of motions made by Ministers. 
No minister or front-bench spokespersons can be a member of PAC, although the Financial 
Secretary at the Treasury can attend by right (although he or she rarely does so). Changes 
can be made if members become ministers or opposition spokespersons. The Committee 
make-up reflects that of Parliament, currently with 9 Labour members, 5 Conservative 
members, and 2 minority party members (at present from the Liberal Democrats). From the 
new Parliament in 2010 it is possible that PAC members may be elected by MPs as a whole 
instead of being nominated by Whips through ‘the usual channels’.  
 
2.3 Attendance by MPs at committee sessions can vary and it tends not to reach 50 per 
cent, on average. Figure 2 summarises recent attendance during the 2007-08 session, and 
Figure 3 looks at member attendance over the last five years. One of the Chair’s key roles is 
to keep their members active and involved. 
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Figure 2: PAC Members’ Attendance at Committee during the 2007-2008 session 
 
Committee Member Meetings Attended 
Total 
Meetings 
Held 
Percentage 
Attended 
Leigh, Mr Edward (Chairman) 57 63 90 
Mitchell, Mr Austin 50 63 79 
Bacon, Mr Richard 46 63 73 
Hill, Mr Keith (added 8.11.07) 41 62 66 
Williams, Mr Alan 39 63 62 
Griffiths, Mr Nigel (added 8.11.07) 34 62 55 
Davidson, Mr Ian 33 63 52 
Pugh, Dr John 31 63 49 
Wilson, Mr Phil (added 8.11.07) 26 62 42 
Touhig, Mr Don 26 63 41 
Dunne, Mr Philip 25 63 40 
Smith, Ms Geraldine (added 8.11.07) 22 62 35 
Curry, Mr David 20 63 32 
Browning, Ms Angela 16 63 25 
Burstow, Mr Paul (added 29.1.08) 10 45 22 
Eagle, Ms Angela (added 19.11.07) 1 60 2 
Brooke, Ms Annette (discharged 
28.1.08) 
0 17 0 
Average attendance (%) 45 
 
Source: Computed from House of Commons Sessional Return 2007-2008. 
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Figure 3: PAC Members’ Session Attendance 2003-2008 
 
Session Total Number of Meetings 
Overall 
attendance at 
meetings (%) 
New 
members 
added 
Turnover of 
members during 
this session (%) 
2003-2004 55 49 4 25 
2004-2005 25 41 0 0 
2005-2006 68 49 5 31 
2006-2007 53 47 5 31 
2007-2008 63 47 - - 
 
Source: Computed from House of Commons Sessional Returns. Members added always replaced MPs 
discharged. 
 
2.3 By convention the Chair of the PAC is always a member of the opposition. The current 
Chairman is the Right Honourable Edward Leigh MP, who has been in post since 2001.  
Prior to this David Davis held the post. As can be seen in the Figure 2, the Chairman will 
tend to attend more PAC sessions than any other member, reflecting the fact that he or  
she is highly influential in its work and in setting the agenda for NAO investigations. In fact, 
the PAC Chair occupies a critically important but little known constitutional position. For 
instance, there are large parts of the UK defence and intelligence budgets on which financial 
management issues and the progress on contracts is reported by NAO to the PAC Chair on 
a secret basis. Thus the PAC Chair alone is often the main person outside government to 
know about such matters, and they are not reported to PAC or to Parliament more broadly. 
The PAC Chairman also occupies a sensitive position. Both he and the C&AG receive a 
large number of complaints and allegations about conflicts of interest, lapses from good 
financial management practice or corruption in government and government contracting.  
On these issues NAO will sometimes undertake investigations and report to him 
confidentially, and many matters are considered by the Chair and C&AG alone.  
 
2.4 The PAC Chair often has a tendency to be publicly outspoken about departmental 
failings revealed in NAO reports, and this criticism is often reflected in the media upon the 
publication of a PAC report. The Chair’s criticism are always much starker and phrased in 
more populist terms than the guarded judgements of NAO itself, because the Office must 
clear all its reports in every factual respect with the departments or agencies concerned. 
NAO is thus often rather constrained in its language, whereas the PAC Chair has no such 
constraints. A LexisNews search of UK media outlets for the past five years yields over 1,800 
results for the NAO and the Chair’s name – see Figure 4. Given that there have already 
been 204 references this year, we extrapolate that there may be as many as 500 references 
by years end. 
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Figure 4: News coverage for NAO reports 2004-2009 
 
Source: LexisNews Searches. Search terms were “NAO” OR “National Audit Office” AND “Edward Leigh”. 
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Chapter 3:  
The VFM Report Process 
 
3.1 Every year NAO develops with Whitehall departments and major agencies a two-year 
forward programme of potential reports, which is then published and usually followed 
through with a high level of consistency. There is flexibility built in to this programme, so that 
topical issues can be examined. Topics have to be agreed by the departments concerned 
and there are often delicate negotiations to spread the load of 60 VFM reports a year across 
a range of ministries and other bodies, to achieve a fair burden-share. All final decisions  
on what reports are undertaken rest with the C&AG. The areas for VFM study are strongly 
influenced by an ongoing VFM risk assessment of department groups from NAO teams, who 
also look at previous work programmes (to return to topics meriting a re-look). Suggestions 
from MPs and PAC members (especially the PAC Chair) are often influential. The list of 
topics may also be influenced by suggestions from NAO’s strategic partners (involved in 
carrying out VFM work) and other interlocutors.  
 
3.2 VFM work is made up of three parts, planning, investigation and reporting. At the 
planning stage, VFM teams will assess the appropriateness of performing a VFM study in  
a certain area, and will then draft a business case for review by the C&AG. Business cases 
summarise the background motivation for performing the study, its intended scope, likely 
recommendations and its impact. The C&AG is given three options for the focus of each 
study to choose between, as well as the option to end the research at that point. The 
business case will outline costs and timescales for the completion of the study (generally  
of the order of £300,000 to £400,000 per report). The case will also contain an assessment 
of the risks to the project, such as timeliness, cost, participation by the department involved, 
clearance issues, political risks and any other factors that might impede the effectiveness  
of the study. VFM teams consult departments at this stage and negotiate their approval for 
the study. 
 
3.3 Once the C&AG‘s go ahead is received studies typically take between six months and a 
year to complete (though occasionally less or more than this). Figure 5 presents a general 
picture of timescales for a typical NAO report. Reports are generally on the order of 40 or 50 
pages in length, though study teams have been aiming to reduce this to nearer 20 pages 
over the last two years. Reports need to be written for interested readers who may not 
necessarily be familiar with the subject material. 
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Figure 5: General timetable of an NAO study 
 
Preliminary work (usually prior to submission of business case) Month 1 
Piloting and preparation if necessary  Months 2-3 
Fieldwork period  Months 4-5 
Draft report to Assistant Auditor General Month 6 
Finance Director clearance achieved Month 8 
Departmental Accounting Officer clearance Month 9 
C&AG approval & publication Month 11 
 
3.4 The methods used in VFM studies often vary somewhat with the area under 
investigation. In our Hot Review evaluation work, PPG has found that there seems to be a 
fairly common approach to methods in NAO studies. Study teams tend to apply very similar 
methods for each project, rather than taking new approaches that might be more appropriate 
for the individual circumstances of the organisation or programme that is being studied. 
Study teams are small and they tend to focus on using reactive measures like surveys, 
interviewing and visits, even though these can be more expensive and time consuming and 
generate less objective information compared to data-rich ‘non-reactive’ measures (such as 
analysing objective data or using web census methods). In 2008, PPG conducted a non-
reactive academic review of 40 NAO cross-government or relatively broad issue-specific 
reports published since early 2004. Figure 6 shows the results of this review, indicating the 
relatively light utilisation of ‘non-reactive’ methods. 
 
Figure 6: Methods used in 40 broader NAO studies 2004-2008 
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3.5 All VFM reports must be agreed (word for word) prior to publication by the C&AG and  
the Accounting Officer for the department concerned, normally the Permanent Secretary 
(Roberts and Pollitt, 1994). The rationale for this clearance process is that factual 
disagreements cannot go before the PAC, but only a fully agreed report. Clearance can often 
be a very fraught process, where the department disagrees with NAO’s judgements. It can 
also be very time consuming, with many multiple redrafts, as departments seek to dull the 
critiques, or to dispute the findings of NAO reports. Sharma (2007) gives an in depth report 
of this process, discussing how a 2002 NAO VFM report into Waste Reduction was altered 
between draft stage and final publication: 
 
‘For example, under the heading of ‘Main Findings’ in the report, the auditors  
had written: 
The Agency is not meeting its target for dealing with licence applications within  
four months. 
The Environment Agency amended this to read: 
The Agency often needs to use legal provisions that allow it to ask operators for extra 
time in which to consider their applications for waste management licences. 
And by the final published report, this had been changed to: 
The Agency needs to look for ways of reducing the time taken to deal with  
licence applications. 
 
So what started as a stronger criticism of the Agency was softened in phrasing and the 
comment shifted from a specific observation about the failure to meet its licensing criteria to 
a vague suggestion for improvement’ (Sharma, 2007, p. 299). 
 
NAO and departments also have to agree that facts are correct prior to publication, in order 
to give the PAC the ability to accurately critique reports. The PAC members have traditionally 
felt that it is important for NAO to look closely at departmental facts and figures, because in 
their short and crowded sessions PAC clearly lacks the resources to undertake this kind of 
scrutiny itself.  
 
3.6 At first sight the clearance process must seem to leave NAO vulnerable to departmental 
‘hold out’, delaying reports until NAO caves in and accepts their re-wording. This possibility is 
made additionally serious by the fact that NAO’s work programme operates on fine margins.  
If they are to generate 60 VFM studies in total, and 40 reports for PAC to consider in a year, 
NAO must work very swiftly and within tight time constraints. Partly because of this, NAO staff 
are also strongly incentivized to complete reports within the planned time periods and receive 
performance related pay increments where they are successful in doing so. Yet there are a 
number of factors that normally produce more consensual working, including;  
• the professionalism of civil servants who want to account properly to Parliament; 
• NAO’s links to departments run through the Finance Director, who often has an interest in 
improving efficiency and understanding department processes; 
• NAO reports are seen by the Treasury, who also share these concerns;  
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• NAO staff are generalists in the substantive policy areas they are investigating. So any 
criticisms or recommendations that VFM studies come up with tend to originate either 
within the department itself or in professional groups or contractors with which it interacts, 
meaning that there is some substantial backing for the point of view being advocated; and 
• departments are aware that NAO staff control and influence media coverage of the report, 
brief the PAC Chair before evidence sessions and write most of the PAC report that 
follows. So a department that ‘unfairly’ or ‘illegitimately’ seeks to sanitize a VFM report 
may find that its tactics backfire later on in the process. 
 
VFM reports and the PAC 
3.7 The majority of NAO reports are considered by the PAC. Three times a year, the C&AG 
discusses the upcoming work programme with the PAC, and makes recommendations about 
which reports he or she feels that the PAC should examine more closely. The PAC will then 
discuss these recommendations, but there is no formal record made of the discussion or the 
selection of reports. Figure 7 shows how many VFM reports NAO were produced in different 
years and the third column shows how many went to the PAC (ignoring here which session 
they were published in, because there is often a delay). The fourth column shows how many 
NAO reports are seen by the PAC in the year in which they were published. In general, 
about three quarters of all NAO reports will go to the PAC. As NAO is producing more, 
shorter reports the percentage going to PAC will tend to reduce since the Committee has  
a relatively fixed capacity to process business.  
 
Figure 7: Reports undertaken by NAO and PAC 2003-2009 
 
NAO 
Session 
NAO VFM 
reports 
published 
Number of 
VFM reports 
seen 
Number of 
VFM reports 
seen in that 
year's PAC 
session 
% VFM reports going 
to PAC 
2003-2004 57 46 22 81 % 
2004-2005 32 16 4 50 
2005-2006 84 60 34 71 
2006-2007 57 44 30 77 
2007-2008 70 54 38 77 
2008-2009 35 22 22 63 
Average 56 40 25 72 
Totals 335 242 150 72 
  
Sources: NAO and House of Commons Sessional Returns.  
Note: The 2008/09 session only shows reports up to 13 May 2009. 
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Figure 8: NAO reports and PAC Output 2003-2009 
 
Figure 8 shows the number of NAO VFM reports produced per parliamentary year, as well 
as the number of those reports seen by the PAC in any PAC session. While these will mostly 
be seen in the same parliamentary session, some will be delayed to the following session, or 
even the one after that. The third column shows the number of reports that the PAC issues 
for each parliamentary year, so these will include VFM reports from previous parliamentary 
sessions. For example, in 2006-2007 NAO issued 57 reports; 30 of these were seen in the 
same parliamentary session by PAC, 14 were seen in the 2007-2008 PAC session, and 13 
were not seen by the PAC. In that same year, the PAC saw 56 reports, 30 from the 2006-
2007 NAO session, and 26 from the 2005-2006 NAO session. Figure 9, below, shows this 
relationship further. In each year, save for 2003-2004, the PAC dealt with some of that year’s 
NAO reports, and also those from the previous year, or even earlier years. Those NAO 
reports from that year not dealt with would likewise carry over to the PAC session in the 
following year. 
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Figure 9: Number of NAO reports looked at by the PAC by NAO publication year and PAC 
parliamentary session 
 
 
Figure 10: PAC Statistics 2004–2009 
 
Session 
Parliamentary 
Session 
Length (days) 
Start of 
Session 
First PAC 
meeting 
Elapsed 
time 
(days) 
Number of 
reports per  
100 days of 
parliamentary 
session 
2003-2004 257 26-Nov-03 02-Dec-03 5 8.6 
2004-2005 98 23-Nov-04 12-Jan-05 37 25.5 
2005-2006 391 11-May-05 31-Oct-05 124 12.5 
2006-2007 250 15-Nov-06 15-Nov-06 1 22.4 
2007-2008 277 06-Nov-07 16-Jan-08 52 18.8 
2008-2009 126 03-Dec-08 11-Dec-08 7 30.2 
Total/Average 1436   37.7 16.9 
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3.8 We standardised the work rate of the PAC based on parliamentary session, and used  
the metric of number of reports produced per 100 days of session. The results are presented 
in Figure 10 which shows that PAC’s work rate in 2003-4 was relatively low, with only an 
average of 8.6 reports produced per 100 days, but this was followed by a large turnover  
of reports in the relatively short 2004-2005 session. We also looked at the time elapsed 
between the opening of parliament and the first evidence meeting of the PAC. There is a 
clear link between the length of time taken by the PAC to ‘get started’ and its work rate.  
In the 2005-6 session, which was 391 days long, the work rate was only 12.5 reports per  
100 days, possibly due to the 124 day gap between the opening of parliament and the first 
PAC meeting. 
 
3.9 While the majority of VFM reports do go to the PAC for scrutiny, around a quarter do not. 
Apart from the limits on PAC’s available time and energies, there are a number of reasons 
why a report may not be taken: 
• The programme or agency looked at might be too low in financial importance to function 
well as a PAC topic. 
• The topic may be seen as uninteresting or the conclusions as rather boring by the media, 
especially on issues unfamiliar to the general public. 
• The report may be overly technical; there may not be the specialist knowledge within the 
PAC to be able to understand the content and the importance of the report. 
• VFM studies that get held up in clearance or for other reasons may then miss the PAC’s 
relatively tight hearing schedule. The older a report gets, the less likely it is to be taken. 
 
3.10 Prior to the Committee hearing, NAO study teams will brief the Chairman and the PAC 
on which questions they should ask, and which lines of inquiry should be followed (Sharma, 
2007). At this stage in effect, study teams can be more frank about or critical of departments 
and agencies than they were able to be in their cleared reports. Briefings to the PAC might 
typically include: a summary of the NAO report; a list and synopsis of the issues the study 
team feels that the PAC should explore; notes on witnesses; and key questions to ask 
witnesses and their expected answers as well as further supplementary questions for 
witnesses. The PAC Chair will always start by asking a penetrating series of questions, 
operating initially from a list of NAO-prepared questions, although he or she will select within 
it and often adapt the wording. The questions will be addressed to a number of witnesses, 
usually the Permanent Secretary of the department concerned plus some senior colleagues, 
or Chief Executives and Directors of agencies or NDPBs whose programmes are under 
consideration. Single department reports may have only two witnesses, but often three  
or four, while cross-governmental studies may have up to five or six. The witnesses from 
departments have also normally been briefed in general terms by NAO on the opening line 
of questioning. Ordinary PAC members used to see a long list of other possible questions 
but now do not do so. In recent years PAC Members have sometimes asked to be briefed by 
the NAO study team as a group or more rarely individually. Often PAC members may also be 
briefed by their own researchers (who are often parliamentary interns from the LSE) who 
digest and interpret the most important parts of the reports for committee members. The 
senior government-side member usually asks the concluding questions of the PAC session.  
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3.11 Figure 11 lists the number of witnesses heard by the PAC from each Department  
for each year from 2003 to 2008. NAO and Treasury lead the list as they have a large 
involvement with the PAC. (Appendix One contains a further breakdown of witnesses  
from Executive Agencies and other public bodies and non-ministerial departments.) 
 
3.12 Several months after the Committee’s oral evidence session, the PAC will produce  
a report of its findings and recommendations. Starting from the NAO’s report and drawing  
on what was said in the evidence session and any further information submitted by the 
department or agency in response to PAC members’ queries, it is the PAC recommendations 
that are authoritative. Following this, under the ‘Osmotyerly’ rules the department then has 
two months to reply to the points made by PAC.  
 
3.13 The Treasury Officer of Accounts (TOA) Team at the Treasury administers the Treasury 
Minute process, and instructs departments to respond, asking them to send drafts to the 
TOA and to the Treasury Expenditure Team (Guide to Scrutiny of Public Expenditure, 2004). 
The minutes are then approved by the Prime Minister’s Office, the Financial Secretary, and 
by the Whips’ Office, before being published. Additionally, departments also publish their 
Treasury Minute responses in their yearly annual reports, as well as a summary of their 
progress in addressing the PAC’s points since the Treasury Minute was published. Figure 12 
gives an idea of the impact that PAC reports have on government departments. While data  
is only available prior to 2005, it is likely that there are a similar percentage of accepted 
recommendations at present. (NAO have told us they no longer collect information on the 
acceptance rate of recommendations.) 
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Figure 11: PAC witnesses by department from 2003 to 2008 
 
Department 2003-4 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2007-8 Totals 
National Audit Office  74 29 91 52 63 309 
HM Treasury  56 24 79 52 62 273 
Department of Health  13 7 29 7 6 62 
Ministry of Defence  11 4 18 3 6 42 
Department for Environment, Food  
and Rural Affairs  
9 5 9 3 3 29 
HM Revenue and Customs    16 5 6 27 
Department for Education and Skills 9 5 7 3  24 
Home Office  7 4 9 1 2 23 
Department for Work and Pensions   3 10 3 5 21 
Department for Transport  5  6 4 3 18 
Department of Trade and Industry 4 3 8 2  17 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport  2 1 6 1 5 15 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 6 4 2   12 
Department for International 
Development  
4  3 2 3 12 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  1  6  2 9 
Department for Innovation, Universities 
and Skills  
   1 5 6 
Cabinet Office  2   1 3 6 
Department for Communities and  
Local Government  
   2 3 5 
Department for Business, Enterprise  
and Regulatory Reform  
   1 4 5 
Department for Constitutional Affairs 2 1 1   4 
Department for the Environment for NI   3   3 
Ministry of Justice      2 2 
Department for Children, Schools  
and Families  
    2 2 
House of Lords   1   1 
Department for Energy and  
Climate Change  
    1 1 
Total Government departments  
(plus NAO and HMRC) 205 90 304 143 186 928 
Executive Agencies 10 2 15 10 17 54 
Total public bodies and  
non-ministerial departments  
(ex - NAO and HMRC) 
82 36 85 23 38 264 
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Figure 12: PAC recommendations accepted 2003-2005 
 
Year Percentage of recommendations accepted 
2003 93 
2004 94 
2005 93 
 
Source: NAO Annual Reports. 
 
3.14 Following the publication of the Treasury Minute, NAO will then monitor departmental 
progress towards recommendations, and PAC may come back to the topic if the problems 
previously addressed do not seem to have gone away. NAO often uses monitoring of 
progress as a springboard for follow-up studies on very large programmes or central  
issues, especially large infrastructure projects such as the Department of Health’s National 
Programme for IT, or ongoing issues such as Animal Health or Dementia Care. These 
reports will include previous NAO and PAC recommendations in Annexes to any new report 
and highlight progress or otherwise in the intervening period. However, NAO finds it harder 
to return to smaller issues or organizations very often because of the limited number of study 
slots and the needs to achieve financial savings from its work. 
 
3.15 Using information provided by NAO and also taken from the House of Commons 
Sessional Returns, we have been able to look at the incidence of VFM reports by 
government department. Figure 13 shows quite vividly that some departments have a 
tendency to be reported on much more than others, and that the reports do not all filter 
through to the PAC at the same rate. While most (72 per cent) NAO reports go to PAC,  
the rate of PAC take-up is especially low for the large group of cross-governmental VFM 
studies, often because they tackle salient issues but ones that PAC members tend to find  
too abstract or not meshing with their constituents’ experiences. Such topics may also be 
ones which the PAC Chair or members do not see as very newsworthy. By contrast, the next 
biggest group of VFM studies in Figure 13 covering the Department of Health have an 88 per 
cent take-up rate by PAC. 
 
3.16 If we disaggregate further some of the categories of reports, then it becomes clear  
that the PAC favours some types over others. Figure 14 shows the generally high rate for 
education based reports (83 per cent taken up by PAC on average). If we turn to cross 
governmental reports, shown in Figure 15, it is apparent that this is mainly skewed by NAO’s 
reports on EU Financial Management, Validation reports, and Audits of Budget Assumptions, 
which are rarely taken up by PAC. NAO’s reports on procurement and resource use have 
100 per cent take-up rates, while those looking at efficiency, IT, innovation and the provision 
of services by government generally have a lower rate of take-up. 
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Figure 13: Total NAO and PAC reports by Departmental Area 2003-2009 
 
Department for Children,
Schools and Families
Office of the Deputy
Prime Minister
BBC
Cabinet Office
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Department for Business,
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
Department for
Constitutional Affairs
Northern Ireland
Ministry of Justice
Department for Innovation,
Universities and Skills
Department for Communities
and Local Government
Department for International
Development
Department for
Education and Skills
Public Private Partnerships
HM Treasury
Department of Trade
and Industry
HM Revenue and Customs
Department for Culture,
Media and Sport
Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs
Department for Transport
Department for Work and Pensions
Home Office
Ministry of Defence
Department of Health
Cross Governmental Studies
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Number of Reports
PACNAO
  
29 The National Audit Office, the Public Accounts Committee and the Risk Landscape in UK Public Policy 
 
Figure 14: Education VFM reports 2003-2009 
 
 
Figure 15: Cross Governmental reports and the PAC 2003-2009 
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Chapter 4:  
The Impacts of NAO’s VFM work  
and the PAC’s scrutiny 
 
4.1 In this section we focus on the controversies that can often surround NAO reports and 
their subsequent PAC follow-up. In July 2007 NAO published the report Evasion of Vehicle 
Excise Duty. One of its findings was that evasion rates of duty by motorcyclists had risen 
from 30 per cent in 2005 to 38 per cent in 2006. This was noted by the PAC in their report on 
the hearing in October 2007; where the PAC Chairman said of those who were evading tax: 
 ‘It is an appalling situation for law-abiding people when they know that an increasing 
number of people are just cocking a snook at the law, literally giving two fingers to the 
law, so all these law-abiding people have to pay their license…’ 
 
The PAC published their report in January 2008, and this was widely covered in the media 
(BBC, 2008a), receiving a sceptical reception from motorcycle groups such as the Motor 
Cycle Industry Association. In February, however, the Department for Transport (DfT) 
published new statistics, which indicated that the actual rate of motorcycle tax evasion  
was only around 9.8 per cent. By the end of February, Edward Leigh had apologised to the 
motorcycling community (BBC, 2008b). In April, the PAC held a further evidence session 
with the Department for Transport and the DVLA (Driver and Vehicle License Agency). Their 
report that followed in June 2008 was highly critical, calling the Department “disingenuous” in  
its methodology and concluding that:  
 [the] ‘fall in the motorcycle evasion rate from 45.9 per cent to 20 per cent between 2002 and 
2004, followed by a rise to nearly 40 per cent over the next two years, is so improbable that 
the Department should have known there were serious errors in the surveys’. 
  
NAO were also criticised for not scrutinising the Department’s figures more closely  
(PAC, 2008). 
 
4.2 Another report that was subject to controversy was the first NAO report in June 2006 into 
the National Programme for IT (NPfIT) in the NHS. Vigorously massaged by the Department 
of Health during clearance, the published report was variously described as a ‘whitewash’ 
(Wilkinson, 2006) in the media and heavily criticised at its PAC hearing. The PAC report, 
published in April 2007 lists 262 questions asked at the PAC session and contains over 120 
pages of supplementary information from the Department of Health and contractors related 
to the NPfIT. During this PAC session, Greg Clark MP described NAO’s report as follows:  
‘Sir John [Bourn], we have a conundrum here. In a year on the Committee I have read 62 
NAO Reports. This is easily the most gushing and yet we know that the Report was 
published on the very last day that it could have been to be in time for this Committee 
because it had been, we assume, haggled over’ (PAC, 2007, Ev 6). 
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4.3 According to both the PAC report and to media sources (Collins, 2006) this report was 
subject to a lengthy clearance process, where NAO was essentially forced to tone down  
its criticisms of a programme that was overdue and facing escalating costs. For example,  
on the delayed patient record aspect of the NPfIT programme the NAO report states: 
‘Local Service Providers’ delivery of the first phases of the NHS Care Records Service  
and the advanced integrated IT systems that are central to the long-term vision for the 
Programme will now be later than originally planned. Deployment of the national clinical 
record is now planned in pilot form from late 2006, compared to the original plan of 
December 2004, and in its full form from late 2007. In the interim, Local Service Providers 
have provided Patient Administration Systems; these are linked to the Spine for security, 
single sign-on, Choose and Book, Personal Demographic Services (PDS), Electronic 
Prescribing Service and together with other Programme systems, to support NHS 
organisations in urgent need of new or replacement IT systems. However, the plan remains 
for the entire implementation to be completed by 2010 in accordance with originally 
contracted timescales’ (NAO, 2006 p. 6). 
 
4.4 The subsequent PAC report treated the same subject, in a far more frank fashion, 
explicitly discussing Departmental performance, and focusing on important milestones that 
have been missed: 
‘The delivery of the patient clinical record, which is central to obtaining the benefits  
of the programme, is already two years behind schedule and no firm implementation 
dates exist. By now almost all acute hospital Trusts should have new NPfIT patient 
administration systems (PAS) as the essential first step in the introduction of the local Care 
Record Service. As of June 2006 the actual number was 13 hospitals. In June 2006 the 
Department wrote to us stating that by October 2006, there would be a further twenty-two. 
So far as we are aware, up to the end of February 2007 the number has increased by only 
five acute hospitals. The introduction of clinical as opposed to administrative software has 
scarcely begun; indeed, essential clinical software development has not been completed. 
The Department should develop with its suppliers a robust timetable which they are capable 
of delivering, and communicate it to local NHS organisations who may then have greater 
confidence as to when systems will be delivered’ (PAC, 2007, p. 5). 
 
4.5 Through its VFM analyses, audit work and select committee support NAO plays an 
important role in discourses about departmental spending and issues vital to the wider 
economy and to society. NAO and PAC do a relatively small amount of work on measuring 
their own impacts (beyond follow-up reports). However, the impacts of the whole VFM 
process that can and are being measured currently can be grouped into three main 
categories (Lonsdale, 2000): 
• Influencing government practices: As discussed previously, PAC recommendations tend 
to have an over 90 per cent acceptance rate by government departments. Noticeable 
improvements in service quality and efficiency are claimed in NAO VFM studies, annual 
reports, and those of the audited departments. 
• Financial savings: In 2008 NAO claimed £656 million worth of verifiable savings as 
impacts from its reports and programmes. 
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• Impact on parliament: In the 2006-07 parliamentary session, 63 PAC reports were 
discussed in the House of Commons, and 38 were discussed in the previous year. 
Reports by NAO and PAC are an invaluable source of information that can inform select 
committees’ work and aspects of government policy. The VFM work of NAO (and by 
extension the PAC) have had financial impacts on departments, as well as social and 
economic impacts on wider society in general.  
 
4.6 NAO reports can often advance work in certain policy areas. A VFM study will bring in 
new resources (including new surveys and data-gathering) and in responding to enquiries 
departments and agencies may leverage in more resources. Sometimes NAO and PAC have 
persuaded or compelled government bodies to provide them with information, often financial. 
For instance, in a 2001 report, Tacking Obesity in England, the study team were able to make 
an estimate of the total direct and indirect costs of obesity to the NHS and wider economy in 
England of £2.6 billion. Similarly, the NAO report Department of Health Reducing Alcohol 
Harm: health services in England for alcohol misuse, published in October of 2008, reported a 
figure of £2.7 billion annually for the cost of alcohol harm to the economy. Such estimates are 
often influential in putting the salience of issues into sharper focus. 
 
Media Coverage 
4. 7 Coverage of NAO studies, and therefore their wider impact beyond closed government 
circles, can vary greatly depending on the subject matter of the report in question. We took  
10 reports, two from each year from the 2004 to 2009 parliamentary sessions, and ran 
LexisNews searches linking NAO, or the PAC Chair to the issue. [We used as search terms 
“National Audit Office” + report + name and/or keyword; “Public Accounts Committee” + report 
+ name and/or keyword; and “Edward Leigh” + committee + report + name and/or keyword. 
Searching for PAC is hampered a little because the Committee is often only vaguely referred 
to in press or broadcast items as “a committee of MPs”, or simply “MPs”.] Figure 16 shows 
that some reports gain much more media coverage than others, often because the topic has 
been newsworthy already for a long time. Thus reports on Northern Rock (an issue in the 
current economic crisis) and the Chinook Mk3 helicopter procurement (which has relevance 
to MoD operations in Iraq) attracted a lot of interest. Others on sickness absence in the 
Department for Transport, or a failed PFI project at the National Physical Laboratory, were 
much less relevant to ongoing news stories and concerned much narrower issues. As can be 
seen in the Figure, some reports will have a relatively small number of recommendations, but 
will still elicit a large number of questions during its PAC hearing; and still others will have a 
large number of recommendations and have a relatively low level of media interest. It is still 
apparent that the PAC has a much lower profile than NAO. 
 
4.8 We also undertook a further media review of various key terms relevant to the risks 
presented by projects covered by NAO and PAC over the last five years. Figures 17 and 18 
show the results. Press mention of NAO often numbers in the hundreds, and different search 
criteria seem to exhibit a similar trend, peaking in 2007, dropping in 2008, and looking again 
to rise in this year. These searches do not correlate with the more general reporting numbers 
for NAO discussed previously, which peaked in 2005–2006. It is interesting that ‘risk’ and 
‘process’ are mentioned most of all, while ‘good practice’ and ‘value for money’ are 
mentioned least. Some critics might take this as indicating that NAO is less good at getting 
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across the positive messages from its studies that other organisations might learn from. 
Turning to the PAC results in Figure 18, ‘risk’ was again relatively highly scoring, but the 
media also link PAC with themes like ‘taxpayer’ and ‘failure’, reflecting PAC’s greater ability 
to critiques departments and question major project delays and overspends. 
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Figure 16: Media coverage for selected NAO and PAC reports 
 
Report Session 
NAO 
media 
hits 
PAC 
media 
hits 
PAC + 
Leigh 
Recommend-
ations in  
NAO report 
Number of 
Questions 
in PAC 
Session 
Foot and Mouth:  
Applying the Lessons 
(HC 184) 
2004-
05 
425 226 29 6 196 
HM Treasury: The 
nationalisation of 
Northern Rock  
(HC 298) 
2008-
09 
232 31 33 9 90* 
Ministry of Defence: 
Chinook Mk3 
Helicopters (HC 512) 
2007-
08 210 297 36 
3 
(from previous 
PAC report) 
150 
Reducing the reliance  
on landfill in England  
(HC 1177) 
2005-
06 
161 76 26 5 110 
Central government’s 
use of consultants  
(HC 128) 
2006-
07 
50 66 18 7 145 
Delivering Public 
Services to a Diverse 
Society (HC 19) 
2004-
05 
50 15 5 9 
N/A  
(No PAC 
hearing or 
report) 
Department for 
Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs:  
The health of livestock 
and honeybees in 
England (HC 288) 
2008-
09 
41 33 5 10 136* 
End of Life Care  
(HC 1043) 
2007-
08 
15 4 3 12 109 
The termination of the 
PFI Contract for the 
National Physical 
Laboratory (HC 1044) 
2005-
06 
12 5 2 10 124 
Sickness Absence in 
Department of 
Transport and its 
agencies  
(HC 527) 
2006-
07 
10 13 11 13 141 
 
Note: * We used a still uncorrected transcript on the PAC website.  
The PAC columns show results for our search for “PAC” OR “Public Accounts Committee” AND “Edward 
Leigh” AND our search term. Our searches contained the PAC Chairman’s name chiefly to eliminate 
references to other Commonwealth countries’ PACs. 
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Figure 17: Media results for key terms linking with NAO 2004–9 
 
Source: Lexis News Search. Note: 2009 figures extrapolated from results to May 2009. 
 
 
Figure 18: Media results for key terms linking with the PAC 2004-9 
 
Source: Lexis News Search. Note: 2009 figures extrapolated from results to May 2009. 
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Influences on and the limitations of NAO and PAC and the risk landscape 
4.9 According to Pollitt (1994) the PAC’s main strength has been that it is bipartisan, and that 
NAO’s briefs and background knowledge give it relative strength when dealing with well-
informed permanent secretaries and civil servants. These points still seem equally valid  
now, and PAC is clearly considerably advantaged compared to normal departmental Select 
Committees, whose sources of expertise are often limited to the Clerk, committee specialist 
and outside experts retained as Special Advisors, plus the erratic value of the expert 
witnesses who give evidence to them. Similarly, NAO draws strength from the fact that  
most of its reports go to a strong Commons committee, whereas other bodies (like the Audit 
Commission) can only broadcast their reports. Overseas audit bodies also greatly envy  
the NAO’s strong parliamentary profile.  
 
4.10 However, from analysing several hundred VFM studies for NAO under ‘cold review’  
and ‘hot review’ procedures, LSE Public Policy Group would also argue that NAO faces four 
important limitations in performing its VFM work.  
• First, because NAO staff are generalists and cannot question policy, its recommendations 
have tended not be very prescriptive. They often lack details of how the department 
examined could improve its performance, and they do not set out what specific  
outcomes PAC should look for to be certain that performance has actually improved.  
• Second, VFM reports tend to be more specifically financial than managerial, and they 
rather rarely look at HR/staffing issues, contract management or policy delivery in a 
critical fashion, which means that departments often do not learn lessons and mistakes 
can continue into subsequent projects.  
• Third, NAO tends to miss some big issues because of the imperatives of clearance. For 
example, the Gershon efficiency review took place largely outside NAO’s remit – yet if 
major savings were made as claimed, why had NAO not spotted them earlier on? Much 
of the Gershon work related to issues beyond central government, and some involved 
changes of policy that NAO inherently could not address under its remit. But this still 
leaves a big question mark over why large-scale savings could be achieved on top of 
NAO’s constant scrutiny.  
• Finally, NAO’s dependence on Parliament and the PAC and its timescales constrain more 
in-depth studies, and there is a risk of high-profile audits of controversial programmes 
dividing the PAC along party lines. As Pollitt (1994: 547-548) argues: ‘In a sense, NAO is 
performing a continuous balancing act: it needs its reports to be controversial enough to 
remind Parliament and public of its usefulness, yet not so controversial as to arouse the 
punitive instincts of ministers and departments’. 
 
4.11 There are other, external influences to NAO and the PAC in how they carry out their  
VFM and audit work. Figure 19 below summarises the more important relationships that NAO 
and the PAC have with external groups inside and outside government. As discussed in the 
opening section, in recent years NAO has made more and more use of private consultancy 
and accounting firms and some academic researchers to carry out aspects of their work. NAO 
has historically taken its academic links with LSE and now also Oxford and City University 
seriously and it engages in constant ‘horizon-scanning’ to try and ensure that it understands 
current research in areas like assessing VFM, risk management, PFIs and procurement and 
regulatory policy. Because NAO staff are generalists they also invest heavily in maintaining 
  
38 The National Audit Office, the Public Accounts Committee and the Risk Landscape in UK Public Policy 
 
links with relevant professional groups in policy areas they are covering and generally they 
have strong contacts in areas they will need to revisit. The make-up of PAC members can 
allow for other influences from external groups such as business lobbyists, trade unions, 
professions and academics, and specialist press journalists. 
 
Figure 19: Influences on NAO and PAC 
 
Treasury
Academics
Private audit 
bodies
Public Accounts 
Commission
NAO
VFM audited 
bodies
Parliament
Lobby Groups
Public Accounts 
Commission
 
 
The influence of NAO and the PAC and the risk landscape 
4.12 For most of the last decade, NAO has been anxious to avoid fostering a culture of 
‘blame’ (Perrin, 2000; Power, 2003), that has existed in the public service (Hood, 2002; 
Rothstein and Downer, 2008) and which has been widely seen as inhibiting public sector 
organizations’ ability to learn from mistakes. NAO reports reflect this effort in many ways – 
for instance, they never identify specific individuals or teams within departments that have 
led to time and cost overruns and they frame all their observations about ‘the Department’ as 
a whole. Issues involving inter-organizational dealings (for instance between a department 
and one of its agencies or quangos) will often reveal more about differences of view. NAO is 
also aware that some civil servants are strongly critical of its approach, which one Downing 
Street aide described to us as ‘bayoneting the wounded’ – by which he meant, seeking out 
failing agencies grappling with problems and then making life worse for them.  
 
4.13 Senior staff at NAO are also acutely aware that its studies and especially the PAC 
hearings that follow may act on departments as a conservative restraint that inhibits 
innovation and legitimate risk-taking in government. To counteract this effect for at least a 
decade NAO has engaged constructively with new approaches and technologies and it has 
tried to signal that it is not opposed to legitimate innovation. Indeed NAO reports often 
accuse departments of not being innovative enough in their work.  
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4.14 NAO’s role in the arena of public risk tends to centre on project and financial risk to 
departments, rather than ground level risks to citizens. The Office has worked with a network 
of departmental risk managers convened by the Treasury, which achieved some modest 
improvements in risk management following lines suggested in NAO reports. Since 2003 
NAO has produced many reports relevant to risk: 
 
Figure 20: Some major NAO reports concerned with risks 2003-9 
 
Session Report Title 
2003-2004 Risk Management: The Nuclear Liabilities of British Energy plc 
2003-2004 Improving patient care by reducing the risk of hospital acquired infection:  
a progress report 
2003-2004 Managing Risks to Improve Public Services 
2004-2005 Department of Health: Reforming NHS Dentistry – ensuring effective 
management of risks  
2006-2007 Preparations for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games –  
Risk assessment and management 
2007-2008 Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Managing Risk in the Overseas 
Territories 
2007-2008 The Home Office: Reducing the risk of violent crime 
2007-2008 Allocation and management of risk in Ministry of Defence PFI projects 
 
Clearly NAO is not averse to the existence of risk in government programmes and projects. 
Instead the Office tries to promote an intelligent, healthy and innovative approach to risks, 
especially obvious ones.  
 
4.15 This stance is reflected (imperfectly) in PAC hearings and more fully in PAC reports 
which do not necessarily criticise Permanent Secretaries for undertaking a risky course  
of action per se. Harsh criticisms mainly occur when a risk that has been made obvious 
through past experience of similar projects or through international comparators is then 
ignored or not fully taken into account, in such a way that cost and time overruns are created 
or inadequate or inferior service delivery results. The following extract from the PAC’s 2009 
report into the Chinook M3 procurement shows just this sort of criticism with the PAC 
Chairman accepting that the original procurement was flawed, but harshly critiquing the 
MoD’s actions and decision-making subsequent to this: 
 
Q3 Chairman: Yes, I understand all that Sir Bill and a mistake was made in the first place,  
we all know that. If this had been the Second World War, you would immediately have got 
these helicopters into service somehow, would you not? You would have gone back to 
steam-driven Mk2 helicopters. You took five years to try to modify them and then, virtually 
overnight, you cancelled that modification. We still do not have these helicopters. It just 
shows an appalling weakness in your decision-making process. You made an original 
mistake; well that was bad enough but we all make mistakes. Then, instead of just 
  
40 The National Audit Office, the Public Accounts Committee and the Risk Landscape in UK Public Policy 
 
immediately accepting the consequences of that, stripping out these avionics and reverting 
back to the Mk2, you spent five years trying to develop a new system and you have gone 
back effectively to the old Mk2. What are you playing at? 
 
As we have seen, the PAC has much more ability in this area to assign blame, and will do so 
in its reports and in the media.  
 
4.16 NAO studies and especially the PAC reports mainly address issues after the completion 
of projects, or in their very late stages – hence the risk that their post hoc work is not as 
effective as it could be had it been undertaken earlier or in a more preventative mode. 
Unfortunately, both the relative inflexibility of government projects once they have begun and 
the resistance of departments and ministers to publicly acknowledging any problems, makes 
oversight difficult at early stages of projects. Departments also often do not seem to take into 
account previous PAC recommendations in their new projects, possibly because NAO 
reports are overly specifically titled and indexed on their web site, or perhaps reflecting the 
fact that around a third of Senior Responsible Officers on major projects have never 
undertaken the role before.  
 
4.17 Sharma (2007) discusses the role of MPs, civil servants and the media in  
PAC hearings:  
The MPs sought to create an arena within which they could appear intimidating. This 
approach is in contrast with that adopted by the audit teams who adopted a cautious tone of 
disapproval. Theatrical aggression and imposing language of the MPs creates an impression 
to the media audience and the auditees that MPs dominate the exchange throughout the 
hearing. The ‘meek’ appearance portrayed by the witnesses creates an impression of 
subservience (pp. 304-305). 
 
Departmental Permanent Secretaries and other witnesses can often be spoken to by MPs  
in an aggressive, almost belligerent fashion, in high contrast to the relatively benign critical 
tone of most NAO reports. The PAC session could be considered to be a ‘performance’ to a 
receptive media audience which (as we have seen in previous examples) will then take away 
the harsher judgements and statements made by the PAC and especially its Chair. This will 
filter into the media discourse around topics and will likely be the main area of reportage 
seen by the public. 
 
4.18 It is difficult to measure the direct impacts of NAO and PAC on the policy agenda, 
especially as NAO reports are only able to critique how policy is implemented, rather than 
the policies themselves. One recent example which may be illustrative is the extra £10 
million pledged by Defra on 21 April 2009 for research into bee and pollinator decline. This 
followed an NAO report into animal and bee health (NAO, 2009), published in early March 
which discussed the decline of honey bees in England, and also estimated that honeybees 
benefit the economy to the tune of £200 million a year. The following extracts between  
the PAC Chair and Dame Helen Ghosh, Defra’s Permanent Secretary (taken from the 
uncorrected PAC evidence session of 18 March 2009) may be illustrative as the manner  
by which the PAC ‘encouraged’ the Department to secure funding in this area: 
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Q2 Chairman… I am particularly interested in the health of bee population and I asked the 
National Audit Office to look at this and they have done a very good Report. It is part of 
something I think we should do more often in this Committee, which is to raise public 
consciousness of particular issues…If we look at paragraph 5.20 on page 40, we can see 
that the Department spent £200,000 on research into honeybee health. It seems very little  
to me. … Why are you only spending £200,000 on research? 
Dame Helen Ghosh: We absolutely share your concern and interest in the health of the bee 
population, Chairman, both from the point of view as producers of honey but also from the 
point of view of their role as pollinators....You are quite right to quote the figures for our 
historic level of research on bees but since the Report was produced, as you may be aware, 
Hilary Benn and Jane Kennedy announced a Healthy Bees Plan, which is our plan for taking 
forward both the husbandry and disease control in the bee population but also research,  
and announced significant additional amounts of money for research, a total from the  
Defra side of £500,000 a year for the next five years, to be supplemented by contributions 
from partners.  
Q10 Chairman: You see, I wonder, Dame Helen, whether you were complacent about this 
because if we look at paragraph 1.7 on page 12 you see, "The beekeepers we – that is NAO 
– surveyed reported an average loss of 30% of their colonies." That is terrifying, is it not? 
Then lower down that paragraph it says, "In 2008 inspectors" – that is your inspectors – 
"found that 9.22% of inspected colonies in England were dead." I just wonder if you took 
your eye off the ball and believed your own inspectors. In fact, from the work the National 
Audit Office has done, this could be a much bigger problem than you thought. 
Dame Helen Ghosh: As I said earlier, Chairman, in a sense, I am admitting that we were not 
necessarily giving this the high priority that we should have done but, now that the evidence 
is becoming clearer, partly from the work that our excellent team of bee inspectors were 
already doing but also through the information we were getting back from the various 
representative groups, we have taken the decision to put these significant extra resources in 
to both get to the root of what the problem actually is, to get people registered on BeeBase 
and get the kinds of very good information we have about good husbandry, which is 
absolutely key to this, out there among this group of beekeepers. 
Q11 Chairman: You keep saying the same thing and I will keep hammering you to try and get 
more publicity for this. All right? 
Dame Helen Ghosh: Yes. 
 
The PAC is very clearly interested in gaining as much media interest in its subject areas as 
possible, especially in those reports that cover a significant amount of public risk. In this 
case honey bee health has ramifications of economic risk for the wider agricultural sector. 
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Conclusions:  
The risk landscape of NAO and the PAC  
 
5.1 Four different types of risk are important for NAO’s VFM work and the PAC’s operations. 
We address each in turn below: 
• Major project risk 
• Administrative risk 
• Overall budgetary and financial risk 
• Regulatory risk 
 
Major Project Risk  
5.2 NAO and PAC frequently have to consider the risks to some of the government’s biggest, 
long-run programmes. Several contemporary projects have either already been subject to 
large-scale cost or time overruns, such at the NHS’s National Programme for IT (NPfIT) and 
the National Offender Management Service’s database system (C-NOMIS). NPfIT gained at 
least £200 million in central costs estimates between NAO reports in 2007 and 2008, and 
was also at least two years overdue. The C-NOMIS project was scoped at costing £234 
million in 2005 but will now also be at least two years overdue and cost on the order of £513 
million – and with reduced functionality from what was originally envisioned. The following 
opening statement from Edward Leigh MP to Phil Wheatley, Director General of NOMIS is 
instructive in the PAC’s often adversarial attitude to departments they perceive to have not 
performed adequately, or not learned the lessons from past failures in major projects: 
‘Mr Wheatley, you know that I have a very high opinion of you personally, but this is a 
dreadful report: a delay of two years; a project which was supposed to cost £234 million 
which in fact is costing the taxpayer £513 million; it was supposed to deliver a single 
database and there will be three separate databases. You will come with the classic defence 
line, will you not Mr Wheatley, that of course you were not there, it is all in hand now, you 
have learned the lessons, in the sort of school that Permanent Secretaries learn when they 
come to this Committee. However, I have had all this before and I just do not know whether 
there is any point really carrying on frankly… Why did these problems re-occur, the same old 
lessons have not been learnt; over ambitious, weak project management and all the rest. 
Give us an honest answer (PAC, 2009).  
 
5.3 The PAC is especially minded to help departments learn the lessons from previous 
project cost overruns. In the March 2009 PAC report on The United Kingdom's Future 
Nuclear Deterrent Capability, which addressed the programme at the very beginning of its  
16 year time frame, the PAC made a point of reminding the MOD that a previous Astute 
Class submarine programme had encountered cost overruns of 47 per cent (£1.3 billion), 
and that these should be avoided for the deterrent renewal programme, given the project 
cost of £15-20 billion in relatively tight timeframes. In his reply to this point at the PAC’s oral 
evidence session Sir Bill Jeffrey, Permanent Undersecretary of State for the MOD said;  
“I think we are well aware of the risks. We believe we are managing them effectively”. 
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Administrative Risk  
5.4 NAO exists as part of what Bowerman (2003) characterises as a ‘patchwork’ of audit 
bodies and legislation that has been extant for the past 150 years. There are separate top 
audit bodies for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and for local government and health 
bodies in England and Wales. Over the past 20 years the Audit Commission has expanded 
its remit to encompass new organisations such as health authorities (1990) and the housing 
corporations (1996). While NAO has had some expansion of responsibilities in the same 
time, these have been limited compared to those of the Audit Commission (Bowerman, 
2003). Additionally, NAO is excluded from validating government public service agreements 
(PSAs), because this may take them too far into the policy arena, an area that NAO is 
forbidden from entering. The Audit Commission meanwhile, has provided advice to the 
Treasury in developing central government PSAs. In addition, in many less visible ways 
across the central government terrain, NAO’s policy analysis work is often competing for 
influence with sector-specific regulators or funding agencies that oversee or direct funding  
to complex public service delivery chains. 
 
Overall budgetary and financial risk 
5.5 In recent years the UK government has initiated expenditure reviews, such as the 
Gershon Review in 2007 and its follow-up since 2008, the Operational Efficiency Programme 
(OEP). These were large-scale, macro-focused exercises carried out relatively independent 
of NAO and the PAC. While NAO looks at a large number of issues across the whole of 
government, such as the use of consultants and the efficiency of procurement, it rarely 
 has input (beyond an advisory role) into these larger efficiency programmes. The OEP 
references NAO’s VFM work on collaborative procurement, and suggest that NAO will  
be able to act as a ‘check’ on the OEP’s progress, but little more – certainly no active or 
instigative role appears to be envisaged for NAO, just drawing up a final scorecard for OEP’s 
impact when the match is concluded, as NAO mainly did for the Gershon process (HM 
Treasury, 2009). 
 
Regulatory Risk 
5.6 By regulatory risk we mean the risks that are present to NAO in exercising its role as an 
oversight body, and the elements internal to Whitehall and external in the political environment 
that may undermine NAO’s role and diminish its effectiveness. As discussed previously, NAO 
has a tendency to ‘pull its punches’ in terms of its comments on departments and agencies, 
especially in not criticising most departmental figures and reasoning. They are also known for 
issuing recommendations that are more general than prescriptive, and this can lead to a lack 
of learning from mistakes in the audited organisations. All of these factors exist because of  
the difficult departmental clearance process, which each report must go through. It may also 
be that study teams may become ‘institutionalised’ or ‘go native’ to some extent, coming over 
time to see problems from the department’s point of view. Study teams have long working 
relationships with one department, and may often be reticent in public criticism for fear of 
slowing down the clearance process and impairing the smooth running of studies. They may 
also have concerns around causing problems for future audits of that body, with which they will 
shortly have to negotiate further VFM work. 
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5.7 Yet other external critics of NAO have strongly argued an opposite position, namely that 
NAO has been too adversarial in its dealing with the civil servants, and not developed the 
more co-operative relations with its scrutinized community that the Audit Commission has 
arguably attained with local government. Our best view is that neither position is correct. 
NAO teams try to ensure that reports are fair and balanced, often against rather strident or 
unreflective civil service criticisms, but study teams also ensure that clear information about 
which issues are most concerning is passed to PAC via the Chair’s briefing (Sharma, 2007). 
In more recent times, NAO has sought to reposition itself as encouraging innovation and 
constructive risk, undertaking a series of reports on these issues. It must walk a fine line.  
If NAO is seen to be fuelling or encouraging a ‘blame culture’, then this might inhibit 
departments from developing potentially risky innovations that might have the potential to 
provide better VFM. 
 
5.8 Finally, since 2005 the National Audit Office has been subject to the Freedom of 
Information Act, which means that all of its draft reports and associated documents (such as 
reports by its consultants and partners) are liable to be requested by members of the public, 
including journalists and academics. Information on the numbers of requests is not in the 
public domain, although from academic work already published it seems that the focus of 
FOI requests to NAO has been on PFI reports, especially relating to projects in the NHS. 
This is one possible influence that may spur the evolution of NAO practices. A second 
possibility is that after the 2010 general election NAO may be asked by Parliament to 
expand the extent to which it works with other Commons select committees, in addition  
to PAC.  
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Appendix 1:  
Witnesses to the PAC 
 
Figure A1: Witnesses to the PAC from Executive Agencies 2003-2008 
 
Executive Agencies, comprising:  2003-2004 
2004-
2005 
2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 Total 
Jobcentre Plus    4 1 5 10 
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency 4 1  2 1 8 
HM Prison Service    3  3 6 
Highways Agency 1 1  1 1 4 
Small Business Service   4   4 
Health and Safety Executive 3     3 
Rural Payments Agency  1    1 2 
Arts Council England      1 1 
Better Regulation Executive      1 1 
Border and Immigration Agency      1 1 
Child Support Agency   1   1 
Defence Estates    1  1 
Defence Procurement Agency   1   1 
Disability and Carer Service    1  1 
Driving Standards Agency    1  1 
HM Courts Service   1   1 
Identity and Passport Service    1  1 
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority      1 1 
OGCbuying.solutions    1  1 
Pension Service    1  1 
Royal Parks   1   1 
The Parole Board      1 1 
The Tribunals Service      1 1 
Vehicle and Operator Services Agency 1     1 
Executive Agencies 10 2 15 10 17 54 
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Figure A2: Witnesses to the PAC by officials from or representatives of public bodies and  
non-Ministerial departments 2003-2008 
 
Number of appearances by officials 
from or representatives of public 
bodies and non-Ministerial 
departments comprising:  
2003-
2004 
2004-
2005 
2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 Totals 
Inland Revenue 10 6    16 
HM Customs and Excise 10 3    13 
Northern Ireland Audit Office 4 3 6   13 
BBC  4  4 2  10 
Learning and Skills Council    3  4 7 
Office of Government Commerce  3   4  7 
HM Prison Service 5     5 
National Offender Management Service 3  2   5 
Northern Ireland Department  
of Education 
 2 3   5 
Northern Ireland Treasury 2  3   5 
Postcomm    3  2 5 
Strategic Rail Authority 3  2   5 
Crown Prosecution Service   4   4 
Northern Ireland Department for  
Regional Development 
4     4 
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 2  2   4 
National Museums and Galleries 
Northern Ireland 
  3   3 
Northern Ireland Department for 
Employment and Learning 
 3    3 
Northern Ireland Department of Health, 
Social Services and Public Safety 
3     3 
Office of Water Services 3     3 
UK Sport    3   3 
Duchy of Lancaster  2    2 
Duchy of Cornwall  2    2 
Energywatch  2    2 
Invest Northern Ireland   2   2 
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Number of appearances by officials 
from or representatives of public 
bodies and non-Ministerial 
departments comprising:  
2003-
2004 
2004-
2005 
2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 Totals 
London Underground 2     2 
Network Rail  2     2 
Northern Ireland Department of Culture,
Arts and Leisure 
2     2 
Northern Ireland Department of 
Enterprise, Trade and Investment 
  2   2 
Norwich and Norfolk University Hospital   2   2 
Office for Standards in Education  
(Ofsted) 
  2   2 
Olympic Delivery Authority      2 2 
Ufi/Learndirect   2   2 
Youth Justice Board 2     2 
Sub-total 64 23 48 6 8 149 
Other witnesses 18 13 36 17 29 113 
Total 82 36 84 23 37 262 
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